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Abstract
This paper argues that a signiﬁcant part of measured TFP diﬀerences across countries is
attributable not to technological factors that aﬀect the entire economy neutrally, but rather,
to variations in the structural composition of economies. In particular, the allocation of scarce
inputs between agriculture and non-agriculture seems to be important. We provide a theory
which links the institutional framework to the long-run composition of the economy, and thereby
to measured TFP and income per worker. A decomposition analysis suggests that between 30
and 50 percent of the international variation in TFP can be attributed to the composition of
output. Estimation exercises suggest that recent ﬁndings of a conducive eﬀect from institutions,
and to some extent, geography, on long-run prosperity and TFP, may be thus explained.
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1It is certainly unwise to suggest that all economies are equally eﬃcient at reallocating inputs
across sectors. This diﬀerence will be reﬂected in A(t), and maybe not only there [...] the non-
technological sources of diﬀerences in TFP may be more important than the technological ones.
Indeed, they may control the technological ones, especially in developing countries.
— Robert Solow (2001, p.285 and 287).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The problem of economic growth is often viewed as a problem of structural change. Be it the
neoclassical growth models from the sixties or models from the new growth theories in the nineties,
the issue of “duality” remains a central focus. In the former literature it was framed in the context
of “agriculture versus industry” or “rural versus urban” while more recently it has manifested itself
in terms of “unskilled versus skilled”. For economists such as William Arthur Lewis, the central
problem of development was to be solved by ensuring that agriculture continued to maintain its
production levels while workers moved to the nascent industrial sector. In the more recent economic
growth literature, papers such as Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) provided evidence that an
augmented version of the Solow Model with human capital provided better empirical support than
as p e c i ﬁcation with only raw labor and physical capital, paving the way for a huge literature based
on the distinction between the educated versus the uneducated.
A more recent outgrowth of the new growth theory has been increasing evidence suggesting
that diﬀerences in living standards can be overwhelmingly explained by diﬀerences in total factor
productivity (TFP) and not diﬀerences in the stocks of raw labor, human capital and physical
capital. Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) were the initial studies
suggesting that diﬀerences in TFP might explain more than 60% of the diﬀerences in output
per worker.1 Not surprisingly, this has led to an increasing focus on explaining diﬀerences in
TFP rather than factor accumulation. For example, Hall and Jones themselves provide estimates
that the “social infrastructure” of societies are important in explaining these diﬀerences. Social
infrastructure is argued to be determined by factors such as the long run evolution of institutions
that protect property rights, in turn aﬀected by colonial history, and even geographical factors.2
Of course ultimately these factors may help determine the pace of technology adoption and factor
accumulation — the more proximate determinants of output.
1R e c e n tw o r ks u p p o r t i n gt h i sv i e wi n c l u d e sE a s t e rly and Levine (2001) and Hendricks (2002).
2Other contributions supporting the view that institutions are key, and that geography matter indirectly through
them, include Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2002).In this paper we attempt to build a bridge between these recent developments and the more
long-standing view that an economy’s living standards are strongly tied to its composition of output.
More speciﬁcally, we show that there exists a mapping from two sector models to the single sector
models of the type used by Hall and Jones (which represents a large class of models in growth
theory) such that the aggregate TFP measured in the latter variety can be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by the structure of an economy. Moreover, we incorporate a mechanism such that institutional
quality determines the composition of output and hence, build a theory that explicitly models the
links from institutional diﬀerences to diﬀerences in aggregate TFP. Our claim, therefore is that
the correlation between institutions and TFP arises primarily because the former determines the
composition of the economy between agriculture and non-agriculture. The theoretical argument
rests on three elements.
First, aggregate income per worker can be regarded as a weighted sum of labor productivity
in the individual sectors of the economy. At its most basic level; a weighted sum of labor produc-
tivity in agriculture and “non”-agriculture. When levels accounting is conducted, then part of the
“residual” will be explained by the weights and the relative productivity of the respective sectors.
Second, the agricultural sector is usually more labor intensive, and less capital intensive, than the
non-agricultural sector. In order to simplify the theoretical analysis, we will make the extreme
assumption that capital only serves as an input in the non-agricultural sector.3 Third, “weak”
institutions tend to make foreign investors less willing to supply funds for domestic borrowers.
Speciﬁcally, while domestic borrowers are credit constrained in the international capital markets,
a more “sound” institutional framework facilitates the access to these markets, where capital can
be obtained at a lower cost. Institutions will therefore matter for the rate of capital accumulation,
and ultimately, for the structure of the economy and the standards of living.
The three elements interact in the following way. In countries with a “strong” institutional
framework, the rate of capital accumulation will be higher due to the relatively easy access to world
capital markets. As capital accumulates, labor is shifted from agriculture into manufacturing, since
t h el a t t e ri sa b l et oo ﬀer a higher wage. In transition, therefore, the economy ventures through
the structural transformation described by authors such as Kuznets (1957) and Chenery (1960),
3A recent study Martin and Mitra (2002) estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function for a cross-section of
developing countries and ﬁnd that the capital elasticity in agriculture is relatively modest, at 0.12. However, the
authors also ﬁnd that the translog production function outperforms the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation. Thus, the share
is likely to change during development. In any case, suppressing capital in the agricultural sector has been a commonly
used simpliﬁcation in the literature on dual economies. See e.g. Jorgenson (1961) and Dixit (1970). More recent
examples include Kögel and Prskawetz (2001) and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2002). In our accounting exercise,
however, we do allow capital to enter the agrarian production function.
3whereby output is reallocated from agriculture into sectors such as manufacturing and services.
However, in the present framework, the agricultural sector is not degenerate, in the sense that its size
tends to become inﬁnitesimally small in the long-run. Rather, the size of the agricultural sector will
tend to a (non-zero) steady state plateau. In the steady state countries with strong institutions, will
be characterized by lower agricultural output shares. Since the average productivity in agriculture
is relatively lower than in non-agriculture, a higher share of agriculture will entail lower aggregate
income per worker. Moreover, we show how standard calculations of aggregate TFP will tend to
engulf this composition eﬀect. Therefore, in a reduced form sense, aggregate TFP will be aﬀected
by institutions.
Finally our model also suggests alternative routes through which human capital can aﬀect
aggregate TFP as opposed to the more traditional catch-up arguments.4 As long as human capital
increases the marginal product of labor in the non-agricultural sector more than in agriculture, an
increase in the stock of human capital moves labor into the non-agricultural sector. This occurs
due to the interaction between human capital and capital accumulation in the non-agrarian sector.
Again as long as the relative productivity in agriculture is lower, this raises aggregate output
per worker. Aggregate calculations of TFP will also mask this eﬀect. Further if one concurs
with the view that measures of human capital should also include health capital, then to the
extent that geography matters for health outcomes, geography will matter too, for aggregate TFP
independently of institutions.5
In the empirical portion, we undertake some static decomposition exercises to support our
argument that observed variations in measured aggregate TFP are indeed driven by diﬀerences in
the composition of output. These exercises are similar in spirit to Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). The theoretical model provides a framework to do this without us
requiring any further assumptions beyond the standard assumptions prevalent in the literature on
levels-accounting, and without actually estimating sector speciﬁc levels of TFP. Finally, we present
econometric evidence suggesting that the historical determinants of the evolution of institutions
and to some extent geographical factors are signiﬁcant in explaining the structure of output across
e c o n o m i e sw h i c hi nt u r na r em o r ei m p o r t a n ti ne x p l a i n i n gT F Pd i ﬀerences. In fact, once the
structural composition of the economy is controlled for, measures of institutional quality are no
longer signiﬁcantly related to the level of TFP, which indicates that a critical manifestation of “high
4See Nelson and Phelps (1965).
5See Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Schultz (1999), on the relationship between climate and health. See Weil (2001)
for a discussion of microeconomic evidence on the relationship between health and productivity, as manifested by
variation in individual wages and the eﬀects of health on cross country output per worker diﬀerences.
4quality institutions” is that they ensure an eﬃcient allocation of scarce resources across sectors. This
is, we believe, encouraging news, in that it opens up for the possibility of aﬀecting TFP through
conventional policy instruments (like taxes and subsidies) thus compensating for weak underlying
institutions.6
The paper proceeds as follows. After discussing related literature, Section 2 outlines the theo-
retical model. Section 3 contains the decomposition analysis and the econometric evidence. Section
4 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
As mentioned above, the present paper relates to two distinct lines of literature; the empirical
literature which attempts to understand why levels of production per worker vary across countries,
and the (mostly) theoretical literature on dual economies of agriculture versus industry variety.
The latter literature is rather large. Initial contributions studied the conditions under which the
economy would be able to transition from relying mainly on the (backward) agricultural sector to
an “industrial” society (e.g. Jorgenson, 1961; Mas-Colell and Razin, 1970; Dixit, 1970). This ﬁrst
wave of contributions typically assumed that fertility was exogenous, or, postulated a link between
population growth and income per capita.7 The challenge of understanding the (very) long-run
evolution of the economy has recently received renewed attention, following the work of Galor
and Weil (2000). This literature attempts to understand the evolution of economic systems over
hundreds of years. In particular the focus has been to clarify, not only the key driving forces behind
the industrial revolution, but also the demographic transition whereby fertility ﬁrst increases but
ultimatly stagnates and declines. Endogenizing the fertility decision is key, in that this literature
views the transition into “the modern growth regime” and the demographic changes as highly
interrelated occurrences. Recent models which combine the older literature on dual economies,
with the more recent contributions on growth over the very long run, includes Hansen and Prescott
(2002) and Kögel and Prskawetz (2001). The two papers most closely related to the theoretical
6In the end, combining the ﬁnding that TFP is the main source of global inequality with the notion that institutions
determines TFP is slightly worrisome. At face value, together these ﬁndings essentially mean that a variable that
measures our ignorance can be explained by a variable we don’t really know how to create.
7A series of recent contributions examine this structural transformation of the economy in models featuring
optimizing behavior of households, but exogenous fertility. Kongasmut et al (2002) extends the analysis to allow for
a service sector, the importance of which rises during development. Gollin et al (2000, 2002) argues that a major
reason for the variation in living standards, as reﬂected in post-WWII data, can be attributed to diﬀerences in the
timing of the structural transformation. A view very much in accord with the ideas forwarded in Lucas (2000).
Laitner (2000) shows how the savings rate may increase over time in an economy, as a consequence of structural
adjustment, and Robertson (1999) argues that a dual economy framework may be useful in understanding how large
income diﬀerences may co-exist along side small diﬀerences in real rates of return on capital.
5argument forwarded here, however, are Graham and Temple (2001) and Restuccia (2002). Both
papers establish a link from the composition of output to measured TFP, albeit through diﬀerent
mechanisms.
Graham and Temple (2001) considers the possibility of economies of scale in the non-agricultural
sector, arising from agglomeration externalities. These are shown to lead to multiple steady states,
distinguished by the level of income per worker, and by the output contribution of agriculture. The
authors show that standard measures of TFP might be capturing the inﬂuence from such multiplic-
ity, and consequently, from the sectoral composition of output. Restuccia’s (2002) argument builds
on the premise that the level of agricultural TFP is lower than that of the non-agricultural sector.
He proceeds to show how aggregate TFP may be regarded as (roughly) a weighted sum of TFP
in the two sectors, where the weights consists of the respective labor shares. He also shows how
barriers to capital accumulation will matter for the long-run output composition of the economy.8
The present paper does not focus on the issue of multiple equilibria, makes no use of externalities,
is consistent with common levels of TFP across sectors, and moreover, provides a theoretical link
between institutions, the size of the agrarian sector, and TFP. Irrespective of these diﬀerences in
analytical framework, it should however be pointed out that our empirical approach is unable to
distinguish between diﬀerent mapping from sectoral shares to GDP. Consequently our empirical
results can equally well be seen as supportive of the views forwarded in Graham and Temple (2001)
and Restuccia (2002).
Our empirical work is related to the recent inquiry into the causes of diﬀerences in levels of
income per worker, which argues that institutions (and indirectly, geography) are pivotal in un-
derstanding such diﬀerences (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Easterly and Levine,
2002), as well as contributions which have focused on quantifying the growth contributions stem-
ming from structural change (Robinson , 1971; Dowrick and Gemmel, 1991; Caselli and Coleman,
2001). Robinson ﬁnd, in a cross-section of developing countries, that between ﬁfteen and twenty
percent of the annual growth from 1955-1968 can be attributed to the reallocation of resources, i.e.
capital and labor, from agriculture to (a more productive) non-agricultural sector. Dowrick and
Gemmel attempt to distinguish between diﬀerent convergence clubs, and also ﬁnd that intersectoral
labor allocation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth from 1960-85. Caselli and Coleman (2001) argue
that the structural transformation of the US economy was instrumental for the observed regional
convergence of income per worker.
8Finally, another approach at explaining TFP diﬀerences is that of Caselli and Coleman (2002) where TFP or
eﬃciency is “factor-speciﬁc”. They ﬁnd that increased eﬃciency associated with skilled labor comes at the cost of
reduced eﬃciency of unskilled labor. Thus they focus on factor diﬀerences and not on sectoral diﬀerences.
6Our approach combines these two strands of literature in arguing that climate and institutions
matter for the reallocation of resources and thus for growth, as manifested in levels. A diﬀerence,
however, to previous contributions on the growth implications of structural transformation is that
while these concentrated on income per worker (or capita), we examine the implications for mea-
sured TFP. Like the recent empirical literature on level diﬀerences, we pay close attention to the
endogeneity of both institutions, and the composition of output.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy where individuals have partial access to international capital mar-
kets. The economy is inhabited by an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping generations. The total
population is assumed constant and of measure one. Time is discrete t =0 ,1,2...,a n da l lm a r k e t s
are competitive. The economy comprises two sectors producing a homogenous good, which can
either be consumed or invested. The price of output is normalized to one. The two sectors diﬀer
with respect to their inputs, as detailed below.
2.1 Production
Consider the agricultural sector (from now on referred to as “the a-sector”). Here production uses
human capital, h,r a wl a b o r ,La, and a natural resource, N, which can be thought of as land. The





γ N1−γ, 0 <γ<1. (1)
As the size of the labor force has been normalized to one, La
t also represents the share of the labor
force allocated to the a-sector. As can be seen, constant returns to labor and land is assumed
to prevail. Aa
t represents an index for technology in the a-sector. It expands over time at the
exogenous rate g. The stock of human capital is constant over time, but may vary from one
economy to the next, due to diﬀerences in schooling and/or geographic circumstances. The latter
caused by the likely relationship between climate and health status, as argued above. For simplicity
land is considered a free good which is being fully utilized at all points in time. Without loss we
normalize N to one in the remaining. In order to avoid the need for handling pure proﬁts, we
assume that all rents in the a-sector go to labor. As a result, the real wage in the a-sector, wa,i s








7In the non-agricultural sector (“the m-sector”) production makes use of physical capital, Kt,h u m a n




















where 0 <α<1. I tw i l lb em a i n t a i n e dt h r o u g h o u tt h a tt h et h eg r o w t hr a t eo fAm and Aa
coincide.9 As is apparent, technological progress is assumed to manifest itself in diﬀerent ways
in the two sectors. This assumption is made so as to allow for a steady state with constant
output shares.10 Producers face competitive factor markets, and maximize proﬁts. Consequently,
in this sector both factors of production are hired until their respective marginal products equal












where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital. It is assumed, for simplicity only, that capital
depreciates fully during a period: δ =1 . Since the consumers are borrowing constrained, as
explained below, the domestic real rate of interest will not generally equal the rate of interest
prevailing on the world capital market, rw. Indeed, we will assume that rw falls short of the
domestic real rate of return, so as to ensure that consumers are borrowing constrained at all points
in time. This assumption will, as demonstrated below, allow for a simple link between “institutions”,
capital accumulation, duality of production and, ultimately, long-run productivity.
2.2 Labor Market Clearing
Allowing labor to be fully mobile across sectors implies that the real wages in the two sectors
will be fully equalized. According to prevailing empirical evidence, however, this is not a realistic
feature.11 Rather, real wages appear to be lower in the a-sector. In order to allow for a persistent
wage gap we follow Jorgenson (1961) in assuming that workers are indiﬀerent between working in
either sector if
wa
t =( 1− µ) · wm
t = wt, 0 <µ<1. (5)
9While conventional wisdom is that TFP is likely to be lower in the agricultural sector, recent empirical work has
shed some doubt about this proposition. The study by Bernard and Jones (1996) show no tendency for the level nor
the growth rate of TFP to be lower in agriculture than in manufacturing, in a sample of OECD countries. Similarly,
Martin and Mitra (2002) ﬁnd, in a sample of developing countries, that TFP growth is as least as high in agriculture
as in the manufacturing sector.
10An alternative would be to allow for diﬀerent growth rates of A in the two sectors, and then assume that the two
growth rates are such that a steady state with constant output shares exist. Restuccia (2002) follows this approach.
11See Temple (2002) for a discussion of evidence on wage diﬀerences across sectors in less developed economies.
The wage level in manufacturing tend to be (at least) 40 percent higher than in agriculture.
8One may think of µwm as the total costs associated with searching for, and obtaining, a job in the
m-sector.12 Accordingly, we posit the equalization of “net wages”, while the gross wage (excluding
costs of search, migration etc.) wm exceeds the comparable wage in the a-sector, consistent with
the above mentioned evidence.
Equation (5), along with the production functions introduced above, imply that the share of










if xt > ˆ x ≡
¡




where xt ≡ (Kt/Y m
t )
1/(1−α) and ¯ a ≡ Am/Aa.E q u a t i o n (6) shows that only when the capital
stock becomes (start out being) suﬃciently large will the wage in the m-sector be high enough
to attract workers from the a-sector. In the remaining we will focus on the case where xt > ˆ x,
i.e. the scenario where the m-sector is active. In this regime the accumulation of capital will
entail a gradual structural transformation of society, whereby labor is shifted from agriculture to
the non-agricultural sector, due to capital-labor complementarity in the m-sector.13 In the steady
state, however, the capital-output ratio will be constant. Consequently, the share of employment
will be constant according to equation (6).A s i d e f r o m t h e i n ﬂuence of physical capital, relative
levels of technology will also inﬂuence the allocation of labor across sectors; a higher relative level
of technology in the m-sector, ¯ a, will work so as to shift labor into the m-sector. Finally, for a given
capital to m-sector output ratio, a larger human capital stock will shift employment into the m-
sector. The reason is that if h is increased in equation (6), this amounts to an experiment whereby
the capital stock is increased so as to maintain the K/Y m ratio. If this occurs, then eﬀectively
speaking the m-sector features constant returns to human capital augmented labor input, while
diminishing returns to hL prevail in the a-sector. Consequently, more human capital will increase
the marginal product of raw labor relatively more in the m-sector, and, as a result, push workers
into m-sector employment. Naturally, such an oﬀ-setting increase in K may not materialize. Thus,
in order to analyze the consequences of a change in the stock of human capital for the employment
shares, it is necessary to look into the process of capital accumulation.
12Caselli and Coleman (2001) argue that income convergence of (US) southern regions was to a large extend
facilitated by declining costs for workers of moving from agriculture to non-agriculture, i.e. in the present setting: a
declining µ.
13This mechanism only hinges on the assumption that the m-sector is relatively more capital intensive. Thus, the
simplifying assumption of capital only being used in the m-sector is not crucial.
92.3 Consumers
Consumers live for two periods, and enjoy utility from consumption during youth, c
y
t,a sw e l la s
old-age, co
t+1. The preferences of a representative young individual, born at time t,a r ea s s u m e dt o
be Cobb-Douglas:







where ρ>0 i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e .T h eﬁrst period budget constraint is given by
Kt+1 + c
y
t = wt + bt+1.
In the ﬁrst period of life households work and receive wage income wt. Income can also be sup-
plemented by borrowing abroad, bt+1. Indeed, obtaining foreign loans to ﬁnance domestic saving,
Kt+1,a n dﬁrst period consumption will be attractive if the world real rate of interest, rw,f a l l s
short of the domestic real return, rt. In this event, however, borrowing is only possible up to a
point. Speciﬁcally, individual borrowing is subject to the following constraint:
bt+1 = η · wt,η> 0. (7)
Hence, maximum borrowing is constrained by life-time labor income. The size of the parameter η
can be thought to reﬂect foreign investors’ perception of the riskiness of domestic lending, which
plausibly is related to the quality of domestic institutions. Accordingly, it will be maintained that
the parameter η is lower in countries with “weak” institutions, represented by, for example, lack of
a well-functioning legal framework.14 It will be assumed throughout that the borrowing constraint
is binding.
In the second period of life consumers live oﬀ their net savings, rt+1Kt+1 − rwbt+1.T h u st h e
budget constraint during old-age is given by:
co
t+1 + rwbt+1 = rt+1Kt+1.











14In the empirical section we will use the index of institutional quality developed by Knack and Keefer (1995), as
detailed below. Knack and Keefer, in turn, draws on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG data
are sold to international ﬁnancial investors, who presumably use these to guide future investments. That, at least,
seems to be the intention behind the construction of the data.
10It is clear that a more “lax” borrowing constraint implies higher savings, as individuals are able
to capitalize on the lower world market interest rate. If borrowing is impossible (η =0 ), the
solution collapses to the one familiar from the closed economy version of the Diamond model with
Cobb-Douglas preferences; savings are a constant fraction of life-time income.
2.4 Capital Accumulation and Steady State Analysis
The savings of the young determines the amount of capital available for production in the following
period. Recalling that the size of the labor force has been normalized to one, it follows that









substituting for w and r, using equation (4), and applying the fact that Am
t+1 =( 1+g)Am
t ,e q u a t i o n


















Observe that the stock of human capital does not enter into this equation. The reason is the
following. On the one hand, a higher human capital stock enhances the real wage, which works
to increase x. On the other hand, a larger stock of human capital tends to increase the average
productivity of capital in the m-sector, thus lowering the ratio of the capital stock to m-sector
output. On net, these two eﬀects exactly cancel each other out.
The dynamical system of the model consists of equations (6) and (9). A steady state of the
system is a pair (x,Lm). The steady state capital to m-sector output ratio respects equation (9)
a n di ss u c ht h a txt = xt+1 = x.G i v e nx, the steady state employment share in manufacturing, Lm,
can be obtained from equation (6). Appendix A demonstrates that the system is locally stable.
Hence, if the economy initially is equipped with an x0 :ˆ x<x 0 < ¯ x, the a-sector employment
share will gradually decline as the economy approaches its steady state. Once in the steady state
t h ee m p l o y m e n ts h a r e sa n dK/Y m remain constant, if not disturbed by changes in structural
characteristics. As is apparent, the system is highly non-linear, and a closed form solution for x,i n
the steady state, cannot be derived. However, the qualitative steady state properties of the model
can be assessed geometrically.
The geometric characterization of the steady state centers around equations (6) and (9),w h e r e
the conditions xt+1 = xt = x and Lm
t+1 = Lm



























(1 − α)(1− µ)
1+g
≡ ψ(x). (11)
From equation (10) it follows immediately, that the share of labor allocated to the m-sector is
increasing in x (the K/Y m ratio). The reason is that capital increases the marginal productivity of
labor in the m-sector, thus providing workers with the incentive to leave the a-sector. Obviously,
the employment share is bounded from above.
Based on equation (11), the following properties of the ψ(x)-function can be veriﬁed:
ψ0 (x) < 0,ψ 00 (x) > 0 ∀ x,










The negative association between x and Lm is due to the familiar “capital dilution” eﬀect; increasing
the number of workers in the m-sector, reduces the amount of capital available per worker, and
consequently the capital-output ratio. In order to ensure the existence of a steady state, which
geometrically is found at the intersection point between L(x) and ψ(x), it is assumed that L
¯
m < 1,
as illustrated in Figure 1. It is clear that the steady state is unique. However, changes in structural
characteristics, most notably with respect to institutions (η) and human capital (h), will induce














Figure 1: Comparative Statics at the Steady State.
12More speciﬁcally, consider an increase in η, i.e. the case where the institutional framework is
improved.16 This change enables individuals to borrow funds from abroad for investment purposes.
As a result, more capital is accumulated, and labor will therefore shift into the non-agricultural
sector. In the long-run, therefore, the economy ends up with a higher capital-output ratio, and a
larger share of the labor force employed in the m-sector. Geometrically, the change in η entails an
upward shift in the ψ(x) curve, while the L(x) curve remains ﬁxed.
Next consider the eﬀect of changing the stock of human capital. If h is adjusted upward then
it follows from equation (10) that the L(x)-curve shifts upwards. From equation (11) its clear
that the ψ (x)-curve is invariant to changes in h. This is due to the two oﬀ-setting eﬀects on
the capital-output ratio from increasing h mentioned above: higher wages, which enables more
capital accumulation, and a negative eﬀect on the capital-output ratio stemming from the fact
that a higher level of human capital leads to a higher level of output. As mentioned above, these
two eﬀects exactly cancels out, implying that the ψ(x) function remains in place when the human
capital stock is expanded. Consequently, the employment share in the m-sector rises, and the capital
to m-sector output declines. Hence the model implies, ceteris paribus, that countries with a more
educated labor force will tend to have higher long-run employment shares in the non-agricultural
sector. Likewise, if the stock of human capital depends on climate related circumstances, then more
“hostile” environments should be characterized by a large share of employment in agriculture.
A third experiment consists of increasing the migration costs, µ. As can be seen from equation
(10),i n c r e a s i n gµ implies a downward shift of the L(x) curve. Moreover, from equation (11) it
follows that the ψ(x) curve also shifts downward. Hence, increasing µ leads unambiguously to a
lower share of employment in manufacturing, as one would expect. However, the impact on the
steady state level of capital to output in the m-sector is ambiguous. On the one hand, less labor
tends to increase the capital-output ratio (capital dilution eﬀect in reverse), while, at the same time,
a lower (net) wage tend to reduce the capital-output ratio, by curbing savings and investments.
While Figure 1 is useful in capturing the qualitative implications of the model with respect to
long-run employment shares of the individual sectors, it is uninformative as to the level of income
per capita in the steady state. To assess the implications for income per worker, of changing central
parameters of the model, a few additional calculations are necessary.
First, by identity, aggregate GDP ( or output per worker, as the size of the labor force has been
16Implicitly, of course, we are assuming that ex-post the increase in η , the borrowing constraint continues to bind.
13normalized to one) is given by the sum of production in the two sectors, i.e.
yt = Y a

























Lm =( 1− α)(1− µ) < 1. (13)
Observe that labor productivity is lower in the a-sector compared with the non-agricultural sector.
This result follows from the assumption that obtaining a job in the m-sector is costly, and from the
a-sector being relatively more labor intensive.17 Finally, substitute for Y a
La
±Y m
Lm and Y m/Lm,u s i n g
equations (13) and (3). Then output per worker can be expressed as:









where λt (Lm,α,µ) ≡ (1 − α)(1− µ)+( µ + α(1 − µ))Lm
t . It is easily seen that ∂λ/∂Lm > 0,
due to the labor productivity diﬀerence between the two sectors in favor of the non-agricultural
sector. Accordingly, since x ≡ (Kt/Y m
t )
1/(1−α) it follows that if both x and Lm increases, then,
by equation (14), so does output per worker. However, consider the implications of increasing h.
From the analysis above, the net eﬀect on y appears to be ambiguous. On the one hand, both the
increase in h and the induced increase in Lm work to increase output per worker. On the other
hand, x declines. As it turns out, the net eﬀect is positive. A simple argument makes this clear.
Consider the steady state employment share of agriculture, which can be inferred from equation














dh > 0 the second term is positive. But since we know that ∂ lnLa


























Lm < 1. This can be seen from the following argument.





Lm =( 1− α)/γ, ignoring µ for a moment. Hence, as long as γ>1 − α this qualitative property holds. In
equation (13), γ does not enter, as we have assumed that all rents acquire to labor in the a-sector. Under this
assumption, labors’ share is — eﬀectively speaking — one.
14Thus, if the human capital stock is increased, it will unambiguously increase long run productivity.
By the same token, if countries with the bulk of population situated in tropical areas are character-
ized by comparatively low levels of human capital, one would expect such places to be characterized
by low levels of income per worker, in addition to a large share of income being generated in agri-
culture. The exact same line of reasoning makes clear that an increase in the costs of migration,
µ, always will lead to lower long-run income per worker.
2.4.1 Towards Empirical Testing: Aggregate Income per Worker and Total Factor
Productivity
In the light of the discussion above it should be evident that when “levels-accounting” is performed
(e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001), the
obtained residual is likely to capture more than the inﬂuence from technology. To bring this out
more clearly, one can rewrite equation (14) purely in terms of aggregate capital and output so as
to obtain the following expression for income per worker, at time t in country j :









(1 − α)(1− µ)
σa











where (1 − α)(1− µ) reﬂect relative labor productivity between the two sectors, ya
jt/ym
jt,w h i l e
σa
jt ≡ Y a
jt/Yjt is the share of agricultural output in total output.18 Note an apparent “illusion”
here: The agricultural TFP, Aa
jt, term seems to have disappeared. Actually, it has been subsumed
in σa. This is because in deriving the above expression we began from equation (14) which expresses
aggregate ouput per worker as a function of output per worker in the non agricultural sector. If
we had instead written aggregate output per worker as a function of output per worker in the
agricultural sector, then Am
jt would have been subsumed in (1−σa) while Aa
jt would have appeared
explicitly. The advantage of this should be obvious: In the empirical work, we need to deal with
only one unknown rather than two.
Obviously TFPjt above mirrors exactly the residual obtained by Hall and Jones and others.
Moreover this term captures more than pure “technology”; the structural composition of individual
18Using the fact that σ
a ≡ Y
a/Y =1 /(1 + Y
m/Y
a) in conjunction with equation (13) allows one to derive σ
a as
a function of L
m. Substituting this relationsship into equation (14), and observing that Y
m =( 1− σ
a)Y ,l e a d st o
the stated result.
15economies matters as well. Whether TFP is declining in σa





< 0 if σa < ˆ σa
≥ otherwise
,
where ˆ σa ≡
µ(1−α)
1−(1−µ)(1−α) > 0. Accordingly, calculated TFP will be a decreasing function of σa
insofar as the share remains below the threshold level, ˆ σa. Conversely, beyond this critical level,
further increases in σa should be associated with higher levels of calculated TFP. Whether economies
across the globe have σa T ˆ σa is an empirical matter. In the empirical section we adress this
issue by allowing for a non-linear relationship between measured TFP and the agricultural shares.
Anticipating our results, we ﬁnd little evidence in favor of such non-linear eﬀects, but rather a
strong negative relationship, suggesting that most countries are below the threshold.
The analysis above delivers a set of predictions regarding likely determinants of sectorial shares-
cum-calculated TFP which are useful in the context of the empirical analysis below. First, insti-
tutions are key determinants of the long-run composition of the economy, and as a result, should
matter for TFP too. In discerning the impact from the structural composition of output on cal-
culated TFP, by way of regression analysis, measures of institutional quality are less useful as
instruments, however, since they are undoubtedly endogenous to income per capita. But exoge-
nous determinants of institutions are reasonable candidates as instruments for σa, as detailed below.
Moreover, insofar as climactic circumstances are important determinants of the quality of the labor
force, as argued above, the model suggests that such variables could be important determinants of
the long-run structural composition of the economy. Consequently, "geographic" variables will also
invoked as instruments for σa.
Before we turn to the empirical investigation of these issues it is worth brieﬂy considering
the implications of removing one simplifying analytical assumption; that technology is strictly
exogenous. As an alternative, one could argue that technologies are in fact adopted from the
worlds’ innovation centers (such as, say, the US, or OECD area). Abstractly, technologies are
adopted from a “technical progress frontier”, Tt, which could be assumed to shift outwards at the
(from the perspective of the individual country) exogenous rate g.19 Adopting the formalization
suggested by Nelson and Phelps (1965), technology will then be dependant on “world growth”, g,
and the rate of adoption φ:
At+1 − At = φ(Tt − At). (17)
19See Howitt (2000) for a model incorporating such a feature. In Howitt’s model, however, g itself is endogenous,
at the global level.
16In the long run, the stage of technological development relative to the frontier (the At/Tt ratio), will
be determined by the rate of adoption and the rate of world growth: φ/(φ + g). At this junction,
At grows smoothly over time, at the rate g. Now it may well be argued that institutions matters
directly for adoption, by aﬀecting φ. Likewise, geographic variables may aﬀect φ directly too, as
hypothesized by Sachs (2001). By testing whether institutions and geography matters for TFP,
above and beyond their inﬂuence on σa, one may attempt to sort out whether this is likely to be
the case or not.
3 Evidence
The data come mainly from two sources, Hall and Jones (1999) and World Development Indicators
(2001). Hall and Jones reduce the GDP in the economy (measured in 1988) by the size of the
mining sector (and assume that all capital and labor are used in the non-mining sectors). Using
their mining shares, we inﬂate GDP once again to include mining. The reason for this procedure is
that data are not available on total employment in the mining sector. In contrast to Hall and Jones
we make use of relative labor productivity in the two sectors. Correcting output, then, without
correcting employment, would potentially bias our results seriously. Rather than correcting the
data, we go through a series of robustness checks below. The data for labor and output shares
in agriculture come from WDI (2001) as does total population.20 Since the decomposition and
the regression exercises require use of output and labor shares, we dropped countries that had
more than 15% of their GDP in the mining sector as their relative productivities are likely to be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by their resource endowments. Further given their special circumstances, we
also dropped all the “transition” economies (as deﬁned by the World Bank). This gives us 103
countries to begin with.
3.1 Decomposition
The motivation for the static decomposition analysis pursued in this section comes from equa-
tions (15) and (16). A problem however is that the model developed above assumes that there
is no capital in agriculture. Secondly the model assumes that human capital per person is the
same in all sectors. While these assumptions greatly simplify the theoretical analysis, any realis-




t · Kt/Yt,w h e r eκm
t ∈ (0,κ) and hm = θh, θ ∈ (0,¯ θ),w h e r eκm
t and θ represent the
20With exceptions for USA, Taiwan, Uruguay, Switzerland and Spain where the data were taken from the CIA
Factbook 1990.
17respective proportions and κ and θ are ﬁnite upper bounds. Incorporating these factors naturally
changes the expression in equation (16). Speciﬁcally, allowing for sector speciﬁc human capital and































The above equation implies that the aggregate TFP equation for country j at time t, can now for
























Hence, this more complete description of the underlying economic structure conveys the same mes-
sage as the analysis above in that measured TFP fundamentally comprises two elements. The ﬁrst
is Am
t which represents the level of technology (and thus TFP) in the non-agricultural sector. The
rest is a rather complicated looking multiplicative term involving relative productivities in the two
sectors, the share of agriculture in total output, σa
t, and terms reﬂecting relative capital intensities
(physical and human) in the two sectors of the economy, κm
jt and θjt respectively. Assuming for a
moment that everything within the squared parentheses can be measured, one can then proceed
to calculate Am as a residual of the Hall and Jones TFP measure (HJ-TFP) and “the composition
term”. With these two measures in hand one can then attribute the variance of TFP across coun-
tries to either the composition eﬀect and TFP in manufacturing. If the variance in TFP across
countries is largely explained by the variance in the composition eﬀect then this supports our claim
that the structural composition of individual economies is important in explaining the variance
of aggregate TFP’s. On the other hand if the Am
t term explains the variance then the allocation
of resources between agriculture and non-agriculture can be regarded as relatively unimportant
vis-a-vis understanding diﬀerences in aggregate TFP.
Next, as for measurement, it turns out that most of the elements in the squared brackets can be
calculated, using data on relative worker productivities and output shares (both from WDI 2001)




































This implies that RES picks up some of the variance in TFP which should be attributed to the
actual composition eﬀect. However whether this will increase or decrease the variation in TFP
attributable to composition eﬀects is not quite clear since the variance in TFP is the sum of the
variances in COMP, (κm
t )
α
1−α ,θjt and Am










where v,u = COMP, (κm
t )
α
1−α ,θ ,A m




1−α and θ to the residual would underestimate the share explained by composition
terms. On the other hand it is not clear exactly in which directions the covariances will go. The
covariance between θ and Am
t is likely to be positive, but there is little that one can say about the
covariance of the remaining two combinations. Despite these limitations, it is instructive to see
how a decomposition exercise between COMP and the rest looks like.
Table I reports some summary statistics for HJ-TFP, COMP and RES and also agricultural
shares (ASHARE) and relative productivities (RPROD).
>Table I here <
Table II reports the correlations.
>Table II here<
T h ev a l u e sf o rt h eH J - T F P ,C O M Pa n dR E Sa r er e l a t i v et ot h a to ft h eU S A .A sc a nb es e e n
from the summary statistics, both COMP and RES reﬂect about the same magnitudes as HJ-TFP.
An interesting observation is the range of variation of the relative productivity variable across
countries. The country with the lowest relative productivity is Burkina Faso at 3.9% and Bolivia
has the highest with agricultural productivity being 28 times that of the non-agricultural economy.
The sample mean of 1.4 is actually quite unrepresentative of the worldwide variation. In particular
at least ﬁve countries: Niger, Peru, Fiji, Colombia and Bolivia have agricultural productivities
at least six times higher than the rest of their economies. As can be seen from Figure 2, where
countries are arranged in the order of relative productivities, most of the countries in the world













































































































Figure 2: Countries Arranged in Order of Relative Productivity (Labor Productivity in Agriculture
Relative to Rest of the Economy)
Further, the correlation between aggregate output per worker and relative productivity is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the entire sample of countries. However for the subsample of
countries that have relative productivities less than 1, the correlation jumps to 0.65 (not shown in
the table). Our conjecture is that countries at higher levels of development have less institutional
barriers between sectors and thus there one might expect agricultural productivity not to be signif-
icantly diﬀerent from the rest of the economy.21 Also note that in equation (20) above, if a country
has relative productivity equal to 1, then COMP reduces to 1 as well. However neither κm nor θ
are necessarily equal to 1 and hence aggregate TFP may still be partially explained by composition
eﬀects though its importance would probably be diminished. Finally, note that COMP’s correla-
tion with HJ-TFP is considerably less than Am
t ’s correlation with HJ-TFP suggesting that while
inter-sectoral diﬀerences may be important, broader national diﬀerences are still key.
The decomposition of TFP is undertaken the same way as done in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997) — taking logs of the levels of HJ-TFP, COMP and RES and then using the fact that:
1=
Va r(lnCOMP)
Va r(lnHJ − TFP)
+
Va r(lnRES)
Va r(lnHJ − TFP)
+
2Cov(lnCOMP,lnRES)
Va r(lnHJ − TFP)
21In their analysis of sectoral convergence of worker productivities and TFP in developed economies, Bernard and
Jones (1996), ﬁnd that the worker productivity in the agricultural sector lies within the same band as manufacturing
and services in 1987, with the exception of Japan which has a relatively low agricultural productivity (See ﬁgure 2 in
Bernard and Jones). Note that none of the countries which have relative productivities greater than 1 in our sample
are considered “high income” countries.
20Table 3, column (1) lists each of the terms in the above expression.
>Table 3 here<
Attributing half of the covariance to each of the two components, COMP can easily account for
about 40% of the variation in TFP diﬀerences while RES still explains 60%. The most pessimistic
a l l o c a t i o nw o u l db et oc o n t r i b u t ea l lo ft h en e g a t i v em o v e m e n t si nt h ec o v a r i a n c et oC O M P .E v e n
then, the composition eﬀect explains as much as 30% of the total variation in aggregate TFP. To
check for the sensitivity of the results, we removed all countries that had populations less than 1
million in 1990 — for such countries the distinction between agriculture and the rest of the economy
may be less meaningful and one can expect the economy to be more specialized in one sector.
Though this reduces the sample size to ninety countries, as far as the decomposition exercise is
concerned, the results hardly change. The 40-60 split is retained. As an additional sensitivity
check, we dropped all countries that had relative productivities greater than 1. As noted earlier
there are some countries in the sample that have unusually high agricultural productivities. The
results are displayed in column (3). Dropping these countries leads to a substantial increase in
the share that is accounted for by COMP: about 47%. To further control for outliers we, instead,
dropped all countries that had relative agricultural productivities less than 0.10 and greater than
10. Not surprisingly, this does reduce the role of the sectoral composition: now only 32% of the
variance is attributable to COMP. Finally as another check, we limited the sample to just OECD
countries. The variation now motivated by the composition term drops dramatically to 12%. This
is, of course to be expected. These are all countries that have low agricultural shares to begin
with.22 These results clearly suggest an important role for the output structure of the economy.
Despite these encouraging results, one might still be concerned with the treatment of κm
t and
θ. Unfortunately there is really no way of ﬁguring out the ratio of human capital per worker in the
non-agricultural sector relative to that of the entire economy and we are not aware of any cross
country estimates that exist.23 However there has been some progress towards estimating the stock
of capital in the agricultural sector. In particular Crego, Larson, Butzer and Mundlak (1997) have
estimated the ﬁxed capital stock in agriculture for 62 countries for various years covering the period
1967-92. In addition to ﬁxed capital stocks in agriculture, they also estimated ﬁxed capital stocks
22Within this group Turkey has the highest share in agriculture at 18%. This is almost twice that of the next
country, Greece (10%). Turkey also has the lowest relative productivity at 0.25. The sample correlation between
agricultural share of output and relative agricultural productivity is -0.53 (21 observations).
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Figure 3: Aggregate Capital Stock per Worker (1988 Logged Values)
in manufacturing and the entire economy.24 The estimates of the latter are independent from those
of Hall and Jones and therefore it is easy to compare the reliability of the two data sets, at least for
the economy-wide measures. A simple correlation between the two data sets for the year 1988 imply
a correlation of 0.95 for a sample of 49 countries and a regression (with the constant suppressed)
of the Crego et al numbers on the H-J numbers yield a coeﬃcient of 0.98. Figure 3 plots the ﬁxed
capital per worker for both the series.
The strong correlation is quite obvious. We proceeded to do a second decomposition where we
explicitly allow for (κm
t )
α












The results are presented in Table 4. Of course we are now limited to a much smaller number of
countries with the truncation taking place mainly at the lower end of the income distribution. De-
24In addition to ﬁxed agricultural capital they also estimate a broader measure of capital stock which includes
livestock and orchards (treestock). The aggregate ﬁxed capital stock in their estimates is greater than the sum of
ﬁxed capital stocks in agriculture and manufacturing, leaving room for other sectors. That is, the three series are
independent estimates.
22spite that, the table suggests that the variance in COMP can explain roughly 33% of the variance
in aggregate TFP. Also the variance of κm
t is relatively insigniﬁcant though it does show sizeable
negative covariances with both COMP and the residual. It is no longer possible to simply attribute
the covariance to each component of the decomposition. That would mean that the total contribu-
tion of κm
t is negative — a nonsensical result. Therefore we leave the interpretation of these numbers





Having shown that a substantial fraction of the variation in measured aggregate total factor pro-
ductivity can be attributed to composition eﬀects, we next undertake some econometric exercises
of how important the composition issue can be in explaining the same.
>Table 5a and 5b here<
Tables 5a and 5b present the correlations between agricultural shares, relative productivities
in the two sectors, output per worker, the log of aggregate total factor productivity. The only
diﬀerence between the two tables is that the latter drops all countries with relative productivities
greater than 1. As is clear from the table all the correlations are quite strong except between
relative productivities and the rest of the variables in Table 5a. Once countries with unusually high
relative productivities are dropped, the correlation between the variable and the rest also jump
up to signiﬁcant magnitudes. However the model developed in Section 2 does not suggest a clear
relationship between relative productivities and total factor productivity. Further our attempt
here is to investigate the relationship between output shares and TFP (for which we have a clearer
theoretical relationship). Hence we retain countries with high relative productivities in our sample.
>Table 6a and 6b here<
Table 6a presents the ﬁrst set of regression results. Column (1) shows the result from regressing
the log of total factor productivity on agricultural share of output (ASHARE). We have argued ear-
lier that institutional factors may be the key determinant of the composition of output through its
eﬀects on aggregate TFP. To test for the eﬀects of institutional quality on TFP, we ran a regression
23using the Social Infrastructure (SOCINF) variable introduced by Hall and Jones (1999). The vari-
able is the mean of the Sachs and Warner index of openness to international trade (OPENNESS)
and a measure of “Government Anti-Diversionary Policy” (GADP) — a composite average of ﬁve
variables published in the International Country Risk Guide that measure country risk for interna-
tional investors. The latter group of ﬁve variables were introduced into the literature by Knack and
Keefer (1995). Hall and Jones were attempting to construct a variable that could adequately reﬂect
“institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within which eco-
nomic individuals accumulate skills, [and] ﬁrms accumulate capital and produce output.” Of course
the average of the GADP variable and the Sachs-Warner variable is only a proxy for what consti-
tutes SOCINF. We would like to argue that the composition of output in the economy is also driven
by the same factors and hence should have the same eﬀects as SOCINF. Further in our model the
relationship between output shares and TFP is clear cut while the relationship between SOCINF
and TFP (or output per worker) is more argumentative. Therefore, our attempt here is to reﬁne
the arguments made by Hall and Jones and provide in eﬀect a theory for TFP diﬀerences. Column
(2) shows the direct eﬀect of SOCINF on TFP which is clearly signiﬁcant though the R-Square is
much lower compared to column (1). In Column (3) we use both the social infrastructure variable
and the agricultural share of output as independent variables. Clearly the agricultural share of
output robs SOCINF of any predictive power. Also note that the R-Square in columns (1) and (3)
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Since SOCINF comprises of two variables, GADP (measure of insti-
tutional quality) and OPENNESS (Sachs Warner Openness Index), we entered them independently
in the regression. Columns (4) and (5) replaces SOCINF with these two variables. Column (4)
shows that both GADP and OPENNESS have signiﬁcant independent impacts on aggregate TFP.
However once ASHARE is added, both variables become insigniﬁcant. This lends some support
that ineﬃcient institutions might be aﬀecting TFP by aﬀecting the composition of output.
A potential problem with the regressions above is that they are likely to suﬀer from simultaneity
bias. Hall and Jones stressed this issue in the context of social infrastructure, and it is not clear
why the share of output in agriculture should be free of the same biases (though running in the
opposite direction). Therefore we need instruments for both social infrastructure and the share of
agriculture.
Since our hypothesis is that institutional and geographical factors determine the composition
of output, there is no reason why we cannot use the same variables as instruments for agricultural
shares as those used by Hall and Jones for SOCINF. The instruments we selected include a) the
fraction of the population speaking one of Western Europe’s ﬁve main languages including English
24(EURFRAC), b) the absolute value of the latitude (ABSLAT) c) the logarithm of predicted trade
share of an economy based on a gravity model that only uses a country geographical and popu-
lation ﬁgures (LOGFRANKROM) and d) A measure of long run existence of formal governments
(STATEHIST).25 The ﬁrst three variables come from Hall and Jones and were used to instrument
SOCINF. STATEHIST comes from Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002).26 This variable
measures the length and coverage of formal states in current geographical borders over the past 2
millennia. The motivation is that a long experience with formal bureaucracies can lead to a greater
stock of institutional capital which might position some countries more favorably than others in
framing appropriate legal systems, property rights etc. Since the variable is based on actual histo-
ries from 1-1950 CE it is free of problems of reverse causality. Further Bockstette et al. show that
it is a better instrument for social infrastructure than most of the instruments suggested by Hall
and Jones.
Table 6b presents results with the use of these instrumental variables. The coeﬃcients in column
(1) suggest an even stronger negative eﬀect of agricultural shares on TFP. The eﬀect of SOCINF is
also strenghned as is clear from Column (2). The results in Columns (3) and (4) are similar to what
we have seen in the same columns in table 6a. In Column (5), while agricultural share continues to
be signiﬁcant, so is openness to international trade. It is possible that while institutional quality
may aﬀect TFP by working its way through the sectoral composition of output, openness may
also increase TFP for reasons unrelated to output shares, e.g. openness is often considered as a
channel for international technological spillovers. Still, it is worth noting that the point estimate of
openness declines considerably, when the GDP share of agriculture is added, suggesting that some
of the eﬀect of openness on TFP may be due to trade’s impact on the composition of output.
The tables also list the p-values for Sargan’s test statistic for overidentifying restrictions.27
The values imply that the null hypothesis of orthogonality cannot be rejected. On the whole,
these results clearly shows that the composition of output plays an important role in explaining
international diﬀerences in TFP. The results in the tables also provide some quantitative idea of
the eﬀect of changes in sectoral composition on TFP. For example, the results in column (1) imply
that a one standard deviation reduction in the share of agriculture would lead to a doubling in its
25Hall and Jones also used another variable, ENGFRAC, the fraction of the population that speaks English, as an
instrumental variable. However, we ultimately dropped this variable, since, in our initial investigations, keeping this
variable in the set of instruments led to poor identiﬁcation results. Further, the variable fared poorly in terms of
predictive power in the ﬁrst stage regressions.
26Bockstette et al create diﬀerent values for STATEHIST using diﬀerent rates for "discounting the past". The
variable here uses a 5% rate of discounting- the same that is used for all the econometric exercises in their paper.
27The regressions were run in Stata using the ivreg2 command.
25TFP. For a more extreme result, suppose the country with the highest agricultural share of output
in the sample instead had the lowest share. This would imply a change of 0.56 points in the share.
B a s e do nt h ee s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcient, this would mean that the country’s TFP would now be 12 times
greater. Clearly these are very signiﬁcant eﬀects but they are not implausibly large. In Hall and
Jones (1999), the TFP estimates for Zambia, for example, is one twelfth of the US. The second part
of the table lists the results of the ﬁrst stage results for the IV regressions where the components
of SOCINF are entered separately (column 5). It seems that EURFRAC, has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on all three variables. This suggests a rather strong role for colonial history. Geographical factors
as captured by ABSLAT has a strong eﬀect on ASHARE and GADP — supporting the geography-
institutions link. On the other hand it is not important in predicting openness to international
trade. STATEHIST clearly inﬂuences both openness to international trade and the structure of the
economy.
We also tried to look at estimations including a squared term for σa, since the theoretical model
indicates that the relationship may be non-linear. However, adding a second order term turned out
to be of little additional value so we did not pursue it further.28
One could argue, based on equation (11) above that what one needs to look at is not necessarily
the share of agriculture in output but rather the share of agriculture in the labor force since the
model itself undertakes a steady state analysis based on the labor force shares and not output
shares per se. The two terms, labor force shares in agriculture and agricultural share in output are
highly correlated, however, with a value of 0.81 for the sample.29 Of course, the relationship is not
completely linear. Still, for our sample in which the mean relative productivity is 1.3, a linear ﬁt
produces an R-Square of 0.99.30 Tables 7a and 7b repeat the same exercise as Tables 6a and 6b
but the dependent variable now is the agriculture’s share in the labor force (AGRLF).31
The OLS results in table 7a clearly indicate that the share of the labor force in agriculture too
has a negative eﬀect on TFP. However columns (3) and (5) suggest that this does not necessarilly
replace the eﬀects of SOCINF, GADP or OPENNESS. Table 7b suggests the same interpretation for
the IV estimation. As before, openness to international trade continues to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
28The two terms are in any case very strongly correl a t e dw i t ht h ev a l u eo ft h ec o r r e l a t i o nc o e ﬃcient equal to 0.95
for the sample of 89 countries that we have. Regression results are available upon request.
29The model’s uses the share of the non-agricultural labor force as the variable of interest. However to keep the
next empirical analysis consistent with the earlier ones weu s et h ea g r i c u l t u r a ll a b o rf o r c es h a r ea st h ei n d e p e n d e n t
variable.
30If instead only countries with relative productivity less than 1 were used, the sample average of relative produc-
tivity would decline to 0.4. Then a linear ﬁt produces an R-Square 0.94 with the coeﬃcient being 0.92.
31The numbers for labor force shares are for 1990 from WDI (2001)
26on aggregate TFP. The weaker results with the labor force numbers might imply that institutional
features matters not only for the allocation of labor, but also for the allocation of capital (physical
and human). Since the latter is only indirectly controlled for, when the share of labor in agriculture
is used as right hand side variable (since it is a co-determinant of labor across sectors), while
implicitly enters directly insofar as the output s h a r ei su s e da sc o n t r o l ,t h i sm a ye x p l a i nw h y
SOCINF shows up signiﬁcant in Table 7a - 7b.
>Table 7a, 7b<
Nevertheless, the overall conclusion, that the structure of the economy plays an important
role in aggregate TFP diﬀerences, is reconﬁrmed. The other conclusion that one can draw again
from these estimates is that this structure may have less to do with trade and more to do with
institutional factors. Finally as is clear from the instrumental variable estimates, it is not easy to
disentangle geography from institutions.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Prescott’s (1998) call for "a theory of total factor productivity" has produced a large body of re-
search which attributes diﬀerences in output per worker to technological diﬀerences (often assumed
to be the same as TFP) generated by institutional barriers and, not unrelated, geographical fac-
tors, which hamper the adoption of socially proﬁtable innovations. However, arguing that aggregate
TFP is solely determined by technological factors is almost certainly wrong. That the composition
of output enters into measured aggregate TFP follow almost directly from aggregation. In this
paper we have tried to take this observation one step further, by asking whether this inﬂuence is
of any quantitative importance. We believe it is. Speciﬁcally we have demonstrated that a sig-
niﬁcant fraction of the observed variation in measured TFP is not “technological” per se, but is
attributable to the allocation of inputs across sectors, and furthermore, that the eﬃciency with
which inputs are channeled to high productivity sectors is strongly aﬀected by the institutional
environment of individual economies. Diﬀerent sectors may be characterized by varying levels of
labor productivity for any number of reasons. Whatever the ultimate driving force, the ﬁndings
above clearly indicate the need to move from a one-sector aggregate model to a multi-sector model
which can account for the vast diﬀerences that exist in the output composition of economies today.
Furthermore, our empirical ﬁndings are based on a very parsimonious speciﬁcation. For example,
in our decomposition analysis, we did not rely on speciﬁc assumptions regarding the values for
27factor intensities, sector speciﬁc TFP’s, etc. Our results were arrived at by using assumptions that
are already commonplace in the literature (e.g. share of capital in output being one third). From
a policy perspective the results are encouraging, in that the output structure of an economy is a
variable that is more amenable to policy rather than the vaguer notion of “institution building”. In
sum, it seems that in order to provide a rigorous theory of cross-country total factor productivity
diﬀerences, a theory of output’s structural composition will be an important component.
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A Deriving the Dynamical system
Note that the ﬁrst order condition for labor in the m-sector:
w =( 1− α)(1− µ)
Y m
















































































































































































































Finally we have, from equilibrium in the labor market:
Lm





























































































The next section provides the conditions under which a steady state exists.
A.1 Steady state analysis





























(cf. 23). Now assume the system is in steady state. That is, suppose xt = xt+1 =¯ x,a n dt h a t
Lm
t = ¯ Lm. Then these two equations collapse to a system in ¯ x, ¯ L which we can have a look at.










































1−γ −2 < 0.













(1 − α)h1−γ¯ a(1 − µ)
¶ 1
α
≡ ˆ x. (CON1)
Hence, the capital stock (in eﬃciency units) has to be suﬃciently large. Otherwise the m-sector
will never be able to attract any labor.



















¯ x¯ Lm =
1+η
2+ρ





















(1 − α)(1− µ)
1+g
≡ ψ (¯ x). (26)
Its straight forward to show that
ψ0 (¯ x) < 0,ψ 00 (¯ x) > 0 for all x,




















m < 1. (CON2)
Under CON1 and CON2, equations (26) and (25) together determine the steady state. There is a
unique intersection. Hence a steady state exists, and it is unique. The next section proves local
stability.
A.2 Local Stability















































































34while the denominator becomes
f0
2 (xt,x t+1)=1 −
(1 − α)



















































































































We proceed in two steps. First, we’ll establish that
∂xt+1
∂xt |xt+1=xt=¯ x > 0.T h e n i t w i l l b e
established that
∂xt+1
∂xt |xt+1=xt=¯ x < 1.
























































































































= ¯ Lm,s o
= ¯ Lm −
(1 − α)








































− (1 − α)L
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Assume for a contradiction that
























> ¯ Lm − (1 − α)L
¯
m,
which is a contradiction since ¯ Lm − (1 − α)L
¯
m > 0. Accordingly 0 <
∂xt+1
∂xt |xt+1=xt=¯ x < 1.T h e
steady state is locally stable.
The crucial assumption we need to make is that L
¯
m < 1 (otherwise existence is not guaranteed),
i.e. CON2 above. But given this a steady state exists, and its locally stable.
37BT a b l e s
Table 1: Summary Statistics32
NM e a n S t d D e v M i n M a x
Agricultural Share 103 0.208 0.155 0.004 0.653
Relative Productivity 103 1.389 3.770 0.040 28.33
COMP 103 0.785 0.302 0.113 1.433
RES 103 0.712 0.373 0.098 2.015
HJ-TFP 103 0.537 0.329 0.097 1.524
Table 2: Correlations
(n=103)
AShare RPROD COMP RES HJ-TFP
AShare 1 ... ... ... ...
RPROD 0.0013 1 ... ... ...
COMP -0.5966 0.4550 1 ... ...
RES -0.2991 -0.2626 -0.1999 1 ...
HJ-TFP -0.7244 -0.0642 0.4881 0.6620 1
Table 3: Variance Decomposition33
12345
Var(COMP) share 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.32 0.15
Var(RES) share 0.72 0.73 0.55 0.69 0.72
Cov(COMP, RES) share -0.12 -0.14 -0.03 -0.01 0.07
N 103 90 79 81 21
32The sample of 103 countries exclude countries in transition (formerly communist) and those with a mining sector
greater than 15% of GDP.
33Column (1) excludes all transition countries and those with mining shares greater than 15% of GDP. Column(2)
additionally drops all countriesl with population less than a million in 1990. Column (3) further drops countries
which have relative agricultural productivites less than 1. Column (4) drops countries with relative agricultural
productivities less than 0.1 and greater than 10 instead. Column (5) uses only OECD countries with populations
greater than a million, mining share less than 15% and not in transition.
38Table 4: Variance Decomposition34
12345
Var(COMP) share 0.334 0.333 0.327 0.324 0.162
Var ((κm)
α
1−α) share 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.006
Var(RES2) share 0.676 0.679 0.494 0.676 0.700
Cov(COMP, (κm)
α
1−α ) share -0.049 -0.049 -0.06 -0.059 -0.029
Cov(COMP, RES2) share 0.088 0.086 0.184 0.092 0.114
Cov((κm)
α
1−α, RES2) share -0.050 -0.050 -0.04 -0.041 -0.019
N 4 94 74 24 61 9
Table 5a: Correlations35
AShare RPROD AGRLF Y/L Log HJ-TFP
AShare 1.000
RPROD 0.046 1.000
AGRLF 0.801 -0.315 1.000
Y/L -0.796 -0.087 -0.715 1.000
Log HJ-TFP -0.763 -0.047 -0.656 0.805 1.000
Table 5b: Correlations36
AShare RPROD AGRLF Y/L Log HJ-TFP
AShare 1.000
RPROD -0.499 1.000
AGRLF 0.901 -0.745 1.000
Y/L -0.793 0.65 -0.847 1.000
Log HJ-TFP -0.763 0.569 -0.782 0.802 1.000
34Column (1) excludes all transition countries and those with mining shares greater than 15% of GDP. Column(2)
additionally drops all countriesl with population less than a million in 1990. Column (3) further drops countries
which have relative agricultural productivites less than 1. Column (4) drops countries with relative agricultural
productivities less than 0.1 and greater than 10 instead. Column (5) uses only OECD countries with populations
greater than a million, mining share less than 15% and not in transition.
35Notes: AGRLF refers to the percentage of labor force in agriculture in 1990, Y/L refers to output per worker
in 1988 from Hall and Jones (1999). The number of observations is 81. (Countries with mining shares greater than
0.15, those undergoing transition, with populations less than a million or Ashare greater than 0.6 are excluded).
36This table is based on a sample which excludes countries with relative productivities greater than 1. The sample
size is 70. For description of variables see footnote to Table 5a.
39Table 6a37
Aggregate TFP and Agricultural Share in Output
Dependent Variable: Log of HJ-TFP
OLS Estimation
12345
Constant -0.094 -1.604*** -0.421* -1.758*** -0.341
(0.061) (0.136) (0.234) (0.166) (0.317)








R-Square 0.58 0.41 0.59 0.42 0.59
N 8 18 18 18 18 1
37GADP refers to the average measure of country risk in Hall and Jones (1999). SOCINF refers to Social In-
frastructure and OPENNESS refers to the Sachs-Warner index. All three variables are from Hall and Jones. For a
description of excluded and included observations see footnote to Table 5a. ***: signiﬁcant at 1%. ** signiﬁcant at
5% and *: signiﬁcant at 10%. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
40Table 6b
Aggregate TFP and Agricultural Share in Output




Constant 0.097 -2.169*** -0.791 -2.267*** -0.524
(0.068) (0.138) (0.611) (0.289) (0.937)








R-Square39 0.54 0.21 0.53 0.24 0.53
N 8 1 8 18 18 18 1
Hansen J-stat. 3.785 1.91 0.23 1.77 0.007
P-value 0.28 0.59 0.88 0.41 0.93
First Stage Regressions for Column (5) above
Ashare GADP OPENNESS
EURFRAC -0.145*** 0.092** 0.267***
(0.027) (0.041) (0.083)
ABSLAT -0.004*** 0.007*** 0.002
(.0008) (0.001) (0.002)
LOGFRANKROM -0.003 0.001 0.102**
(0.016) (0.023) (0.048)
STATEHIST -1.249** 0.091 0.551***
(0.051) (0.076) 0.155
R-Square 0.52 0.52 0.34
38The instruments used are EURFRAC, Absolute value of the latitude, LOGFRANKFROM - all from Hall and
Jones (1999) and STATEHIST05 from Bockstette et al (2002).
39This refers to the Centered R-Square.
41Table 7a
A g g r e g a t eT F Pa n dS h a r eo ft h eL a b o rF o r c ei nA g r i c u l t u r e
Dependent Variable: Log of HJ-TFP
OLS estimations
12345
Constant -0.278*** -1.604*** -0.943*** -1.175*** -1.103***
(0.083) (0.136) (0.241) (0.166) (0.277)








R-Square 0.43 0.41 0.51 0.42 0.51
N 8 18 18 18 18 1
42Table 7b
A g g r e g a t eT F Pa n dS h a r eo ft h eL a b o rF o r c ei nA g r i c u l t u r e
Dependent Variable: Log of HJ-TFP
IV Estimations
12 3 4 5
Constant 0.019 -2.169*** -1.22** -2.267*** -1.222*
(0.072) (0.138) (0.513) (0.289) (0.68)








R-Square 0.28 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.41
N 81 81 81 81 81
Hansen’s J-Statistic 9.44 1.91 0.07 1.77 0.07
P-value 0.02 0.59 0.96 0.41 0.78
First Stage Regressions of Column (5) above
AGRLF GADP OPENNESS
EURFRAC 0.026*** 0.092** 0.267***
(0.083) (0.041) (0.083)
ABSLAT -0.006*** 0.007*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
LOGFRANKROM -0.016 0.001 0.102**
(0.035) (0.023) (0.048)
STATEHIST -0.163 0.091 0.551***
(0.115) (0.076) (0.155)
R-Square 0.46 0.52 0.34
43